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THE ESSENCE OF THE PHENOMENON, JUSTIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT "HYBRID WAR"

The article solves the socially significant problems of understanding the essence of the phenomenon and substantiating the concept of "hybrid war". In particular, the following scientific tasks were solved: to investigate the phenomenon, the signs of which distinguish it from other concepts; to propose countermeasures and methods. It was noted that in the near future, military technological advantages will have to make fundamental changes in the ability to strike. And a country that does not take this into account in its defense strategy will not be able to resist armed aggression.

Keywords: *hybrid war, hybrid threats, armed aggression, cyber war, international armed conflict.*

Formulation of scientific problem and its significance. At the global level, the main aspects of military security are the destruction of the international security system created after the Second World War, the increase in the level of uncertainty and unpredictability of the security environment. The main security aspect in the military sphere at the national level remains the hybrid war unleashed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine [[21](#)]. To ensure the stability of the state and society, the implementation of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine, it is necessary to justify and consider the "ideal" model

of modern hybrid warfare. This will make it possible to optimize the existing and prospective countermeasures and methods .

Analysis of latest research and publications. Both foreign (James K. Wieser [[20](#)], T. Schelling [[25](#)]) and domestic scientists (S. Avramenko [[19](#)], V. Badrak [[4](#)], M. Beleskov [[1](#)], N. Varenia [[19](#)], V. Horbulin [[5](#)], A. Nikitin [[11](#)], G. Pocheptsov) turned to the analysis of the essence of hybrid warfare in their scientific works. [[13](#)], T. Reva [[15](#)], I. Ryzhov [[19](#)], I. Feskov [[24](#)]) and others.

In practice, as noted by British professor James K. Wither, the implementation of a new generation war raises significant problems. Unified political governance is particularly difficult, as irregular and state actors often have different political interests. But hybrid methods of waging war do not change its essence. Violence remains the basis of hybrid warfare, as in any other form of war, and its purpose is the same as in any other act of war, namely, to use the threat of use or the use of organized violence to obtain physical or psychological advantages over the enemy [[20](#)]. The remark of the British reporter and writer who worked in the hot spots of Eastern Europe and the Middle East, D. Patrikarakos, that the concept of defeat always implies a political message imposed on the defeated seems appropriate: defeat consists of accepting defeat and consistently accepting the terms of the winner. The main difference between traditional and modern warfare is the degree to which coercive communication tries to achieve a political goal by military victory on the battlefield [[12](#) , p. 19-20].

U.S. Army General Mark Milley argues that the ability to see and the ability to shoot and fire at a distance with unprecedented accuracy today—these two fundamentals alone herald a change in the fundamental nature of warfare. Artificial intelligence and quantum computing combined with robotics have become a dominant factor in warfare. And he concludes: “It is quite clear to me that the future force must consist of a large number of small organizations that are constantly moving to survive on the battlefield with very lethal consequences. And you'll have to be invisible, either through technology or basic cover and camouflage. But speed, size and near-invisibility will be fundamental for survival on the future battlefield" [[26](#)].

Diego A. Ruiz Palmer argues that “Weak central and provincial institutions were overwhelmed by the often overlapping agendas of international actors and donors. The integrated approach did not bring the proper results. As the Afghanistan experience has shown, local acceptance of capacity-building and broader stabilization and reconstruction efforts will remain a challenge in many regional settings” [[27](#)]. In other words, NATO officials did not take into account the experience of the liberation of the strategic Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001 by the Northern Alliance fighters together with American special forces.

M. Beleskov in his analytical report "Modern Russian way of waging war: theoretical foundations and practical content" notes that an important area of work of the Russian Federation is the development of various types of EW systems to weaken the effectiveness of the enemy's communication and data exchange systems. Russia continues the traditions of the Soviet Union, where electronic warfare systems were perceived as a powerful asymmetric tool for ensuring favorable conditions for the conduct of war, which allows neutralizing the enemy's technical advantages. In 2017, V. Gerasimov, head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, emphasized this. In his opinion, it is EW systems that make it possible to reduce the controllability of the enemy's forces, and success in the war largely depends on this today [[1](#), p. 24].

L. Veselova draws attention to the fact that there is a clear understanding in NATO and the EU that hybrid threats need to be prevented by both "passive" elements (strengthening resistance to shocks or surprises) and more active ones, including powerful measures to prepare and protect functions and structures that are most likely to become targets of hybrid attacks. In this context, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of active actions to strengthen civil preparedness, a free press, education of the population and an effective legal structure. At the same time, a common understanding of hybrid threats does not mean a dogmatic definition that is likely to become obsolete the next day or may affect the nature of actions to counter hybrid threats. Hybrid threats are not only diverse; they are specifically tailored to attack the weak points of specific targets. This

means that each country must have its own understanding of the type of hybrid threats that can be used against it. This is achieved by a careful study of one's own weak points, and not at the expense of a universal definition of a non-universal concept [[2](#), p. 376-377].

A. Nikitin emphasizes that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 use the expression "international armed conflict", which is understood as such confrontation, when one subject of international law uses armed force against another subject. It is assumed that states, nations and peoples fighting for independence can be parties to such a conflict. Since then, since the 1950s, the term "armed conflict" has been used more often than "war". This is explained by the change of political and ideological character [[11](#), p. 54].

T. Reva draws attention to the fact that "Comparing these concepts, it should be noted that, in our opinion, the concept of "hybrid threats" is broader than the concept of "hybrid wars", that is, it covers various phenomena that are destructive to a democratic regime due to the use of combinations of various methods, where hybrid wars are one of the most effective means of influence" [15, [p.](#) 190].

The current direction of scientific research is the continuation of the analysis of hybrid threats and the generalization of discussions of theoreticians based on a historical perspective with the aim of forming a complex of priority defense measures to prevent armed aggression.

Purpose and objectives of the article. The purpose of the article is a comprehensive analysis of the modern content of the concept of "hybrid war" and the development of countermeasures. In order to achieve the set goal, the following tasks must be performed: to investigate the phenomenon, the features that distinguish it from other concepts and to substantiate the concept of "hybrid war"; to propose countermeasures and methods.

Presenting main material. "War is a way of deception," says a Chinese thinker and strategist of the 6th century BC. Sun Tzu, bringing together two apparently incompatible concepts: truth and lies [[10](#), p. 77, 138]. He was the first to argue the need for informational influence on the enemy. He emphasized that the crown of art is to conquer the enemy without a fight [[19](#), p. 21-22]. Ambush, trap or deception, cooperation with

irregular military units, innovative weapons or unusual use of conventional weapons are not essentially new elements of modern hybrid warfare, because they were used in almost all wars of the past. For example, the Kushite kingdom in 700 BC. e. at the request of Egyptian priests who defended the cult of the god Amon, extended its political power for almost 100 years to the former conquerors - the Egyptian Empire [28]. This is also the Greek-Bulgarian war and the conquest of Bulgaria in 1018 by the Byzantines [23, p. 415-429], and the Battle of Korsun on May 26, 1648, and the Manchurian conquest of China in 1683, and the transfer of the hetman of the Zaporozhian Army Ivan Mazepa to the side of the Swedish king Charles XII during the Great Northern War of 1700-1721, and the aggression of Bolshevik Russia against the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1917-1920 [16 , p. 131-154]. In particular, the Soviet "anti-SOI" program as an asymmetric response of the USSR in the 80s of the 20th century [5, p. 68]. The fundamental change that is usually referred to in history occurred between the First and Second World Wars, when three technologies were introduced: the airplane; mechanization, wheeled and tracked machinery; and then they were connected together through wireless communication, through radio [26]. These are actually the prerequisites of the cyber war of the beginning of the 21st century. A classic example of the hybridization of modern weapons is the American *Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey* multirole combat aircraft , which uses convertible technology to combine the vertical performance of a helicopter with the speed and global range of a fixed-wing aircraft.

In order to reveal the essence of the phenomenon and substantiate the concept of "hybrid war", it is necessary to simulate the conditions and methods of the participants preceding the specified phenomenon. In the joint communication of the European Parliament and the Council "Common framework for countering hybrid threats of the European Union", hybrid threats are conceptually defined as "a combination of coercive and subversive activities, traditional and non-traditional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological) that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific goals, remaining at a level below the threshold of formally declared war." "Hybrid threat" is also considered as "a phenomenon that arises

as a result of the convergence and interconnection of various elements that together form a more complex and multidimensional threat", and its extreme expression, "hybrid war", is defined as "a situation in which a country resorts to the open use of armed forces against another country in addition to a combination of other means (i.e. economic, political and diplomatic)" [3 , p. 18]. However, with such a one-sided interpretation of hybrid war, it may turn out that armed aggression by a state or a coalition (union) of states is not a decisive factor. In fact, this is a mirror image of the so-called "doctrine of General Gerasimov". But the incident with the British destroyer *HMS Defender* on June 23, 2021 near the occupied Sevastopol largely showed the potential of hybrid warfare to turn into a full-scale offensive operation of the armed forces. The American professor Thomas Schelling in his work "Conflict Strategy" indicates that there are ways by which the idea of the obligation to carry out a threat can be usefully expanded. He notes that a "firm" obligation means the application of a threat of some severe punishment for non-fulfilment - such that under all circumstances it would be better to fulfil the obligation undertaken. But the obligation to carry out the threat can be extended by assuming that the punishment has a finite value and is not necessarily so great as to be determinative in all cases [25 , p. 162]. Therefore, the above-mentioned definition of hybrid war needs to be changed, as it contradicts the existing security situation in the world. European researchers single out four main pillars that must be constantly explored in order to be able to build an effective model for countering hybrid threats: actors (and their strategic goals); tools used by the actor; target domains; phases (including types of activities observed in each phase) [14 , p. 73].

The "ideal" model of hybrid war was essentially proposed by H. Pocheptsov, who claimed "*that the war of destruction as a basic model of war is transformed into another basic model - cognitive war*" [13 , p. 5]. However, he emphasized that the general model of creating the right type of picture of the world or even chaos in the case of a hybrid war is created in all three spaces - physical, informational, and virtual. He referred to the situation during the annexation of Crimea [13 , p. 103]. In particular, in Russia, they are especially afraid of the development of a fundamentally new strategy of waging war

called the "Trojan horse", when the main emphasis is on destabilization within the enemy state [[5](#), p. 60]. I. Feskov notes that insufficient attention to the issues of countering informational threats can cause significant damage to the political system of any state up to the destruction of the state itself [[24](#), p. 74]. But the specificity of the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014 is the active use by the parties of radio-electronic warfare complexes and UAVs of various classes, and not only transformations in the media sphere. As noted by V. Gorbulin and V. Badrak, Turkish-made *Bayraktar TB2 drones* , which seem to have a solid value, but in fact, if compared with a fighter or bomber, it is ten times less. Strange as it may seem, but in modern warfare, such equipment is more durable than airplanes and helicopters [[4](#), p. 121]. Soon, Ukrainian troops will be massively replenished with the world's first strike companies of drones and artillery reconnaissance. The Armed Forces of Ukraine use domestic reconnaissance drones ASU-1 "Valkyrie", "Stork-100", A1-SM "Fury", *PD-1/2* , *Shark* , Chinese quadcopters *DJI Mavic* , Estonian drones of vertical take-off and landing *EOS C VTOL* , *FPV* drones, American barrage ammunition *Switchblade* and dozens of other types. However, there is no information about the Sokil -300 attack UAV from the Luch State Security Bureau of Ukraine entering service. Although the leaders of the state have repeatedly emphasized the importance of having long-range, high-precision weapons in service with the Defense Forces of Ukraine. In particular, the attacks of naval surface drones and the sinking of the cruiser Moskva by R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles forced the Russian fleet to suspend operations in the Black Sea, which is a successful example of the use of asymmetry or a non-standard approach in military affairs. According to mass media reports, which still need to be further verified, the Russian troops used medium-altitude long-flight strike UAVs "Orion-E" (code "Inokhodets") and Mohajer-6, multi-purpose unmanned aerial systems "Orlan-10/30", "Forpost" (Forpost-R) and Supercam S350, barrage ammunition "Kub-BLA" and ZALA Lancet, drones "Geran-1"/ Shahed-131 and "Geran-2"/ Shahed-136 tanks , the complex for detecting drones " AeroScope " of the Chinese company DJI , as well as marine surface drones.

Taking into account the preliminary data of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine about 5,000 missile, 3,500 air and 1,000 strikes by Russian troops using UAVs against objects on the territory of Ukraine only in the first year of the war and the deterioration of interstate relations with Iran, it is advisable, in the absence of critical damage, to once again consider the pre-war idea of creating a project 1164 "Atlant" anti-missile ship of the European military theatre based on the unfinished missile cruiser actions (TVD) [22], but already with a domestic [crew](#). By the way, when creating a domestic attack helicopter, one can take into account both the experience of designing the innovative high-speed multipurpose helicopter *SB-1 Defiant* from *Sikorsky-Boeing* , the specialized anti-tank helicopter of the Internet era *AH-64E Apache Guardian* , and the Ka-50 "Black Shark" (NATO designation - "*Hokum A*"), which was developed as a competitor to the Mi-28 helicopter (NATO designation - "*Havoc*") in as part of the still Soviet program of a promising combat helicopter. In particular, the Ka-50 is no less threatening than the legendary American armored attack aircraft *Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II*, nicknamed "the warthog". The functions of the navigator-operator in the Ka-50 were actually replaced by advanced electronics at that time. In the Kyiv region, the Ukrainian military captured the Russian attack helicopter Ka-52 "Alligator", which, due to heavy losses, is an unsuccessful continuation of the development of the Ka-50 model.

Stealth UAV from the *AIR company* , a participant in the XVII International Specialized Exhibition "Weapons and Security - 2021" in Kyiv *COMBAT EVOLUTION* . The drone was developed in partnership with SE "Ivchenko-Progres", JSC "Motor Sich" and LLC "Hydrobest". The speed of *ACE ONE* is close to supersonic - it is 1000 km/h. In particular, the American company *Lockheed Martin* participated in the exhibition with the latest modification of *the F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter* . The modernization mainly affected the electronic filling of the fighter - it received a new onboard radar - *APG-83 (SABR)* developed by the American company *Northrop Grumman* , which can detect and identify targets in the air and on the ground at long distances, as well as an onboard EW complex and data transmission equipment according to the *Link 16 standard* [6].

V. Sukhonos and V. Sukhonos note that the state and its institutions play a decisive role in the mechanism of ensuring national security. At the same time, not only state bodies, institutions and enterprises are involved institutionally in this mechanism, but also state armed formations, in particular the armed forces [18, p. 4]. Therefore, it is necessary both to insist on the continuation of strategic technical assistance and to achieve the widest possible localization of the production of spare parts and service of high-tech foreign military equipment in Ukraine. Maybe even modern 4++ generation (or 5th or 6th generation) multipurpose fighters and medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems. In the military and technical assistance of NATO allies, the latest developments of the companies *BAE Systems* , *Baykar Makina* , *Rheinmetall AG*, Polish, Slovak and Czech enterprises, enterprises of the defense industry of Ukraine, such as the OTRK "Sapsan", a supersonic aviation guided missile with a range of 120 km (KB "Pivdenne") , anti-aircraft missile system R-360 "Neptun", RSZV "Vilkha-M" (DezhKKB "Luch") [5, p. . 218-219] and BM "Oplot", BTR-4 "Bucephal" (HKBM; Plant named after V.O. Malysheva) and there is that asymmetric countermeasure that will force the aggressor to abandon the attack. Thus, on the night of May 16, 2023, the destruction of all 18 Russian missiles of various types of air, sea, and land-based, including six Kh-47M2 "Kinjal" aeroballistic missiles [17], by the forces and means of air defense of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces once again showed that defense as a form of military combat has not lost its importance even in [the](#) 21st century . The high-tech weapons of the *FSAF SAMP/T air defense system on a digital system* , *MIM-104 Patriot* in the new version, *IRIS-T SLM* and *NASAMS* allow you to effectively repulse the offensive of the enemy's superior forces and inflict significant losses on it. In addition, the use by the Ukrainian military of Franco-British air-to-ground cruise missiles of the *Storm Shadow/SCALP AG class*, *American 155 mm M982 Excalibur* artillery shells, and *M142 HIMARS highly mobile multiple rocket systems* , which hit targets from a distance with guided rockets with ultra-high precision *GPS* guidance, can even change the course of the war.

After the defeat of the Russian troops, peace negotiations and the onset of legal responsibility for the guilty parties, the issue of ensuring stable peace in the country will appear on the agenda. I. Popov notes that the conflict in Northern Ireland is indeed perceived and classified primarily as an internal conflict of the Great Britain state. However, its duration and acuteness are largely determined by the presence of support from overseas Irishmen and the interests of Great Britain's geopolitical opponents [[8](#), p. 28]. In particular, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) promised to create a democratic and social state [[7](#), p. 80]. Of course, we are not talking about the recognition of terrorist and separatist groups "L/DNR". But the role of international mediators is very important in any conflict. In the same Northern Ireland, the participation of the USA and the EU was constructive, which helped in the moderation of negotiations and during the implementation of agreements [[8](#), p. 33]. In the case of Ukraine, China can obviously play a constructive role. As noted by the Ukrainian diplomat and scientist S. Korsunskyi, "China has pushed Russia out of Central Asia, which Moscow has always considered to be "its" territory (it is the PRC that is now the largest trading partner of all five republics of the former USSR) and is actually deactivating the SCO format, which Moscow sought to use to balance China at the expense of involving India." Before the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, China was the largest trade partner of the EU and Ukraine [[9](#), p. 20, 15]. And for the EU, the situation has not yet undergone significant changes. In Northern Ireland, the role of the media and the information campaign have become unified in order to communicate information about the negotiation process and to create motivation for all citizens. The transition from the "language of hate" to the language of constructiveness is a challenge for the mass media as well [[8](#), p. 33]. However, the "United News" telethon (#UARazom) - an informational telethon launched to inform the population about the situation in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion, proved that Ukrainian TV channels and radio stations are able to unite for the sake of the state's interests.

Summarizing what has been said, the following should be noted:

1. The rapid development of robotics, the combination of these technologies with the spheres of cyberspace and space has a great impact on the nature of military operations today. And in the near future, the advantages in range and accuracy with the advent of hypersonic speed will have to make fundamental changes in the ability to strike. And a country that does not integrate into its defense strategy high-precision weapons, intelligence tools, communication and control automation systems, radio-electronic warfare complexes, robotic systems and ignores camouflage will obviously not be able to resist armed aggression.

2. It is justified to suggest that hybrid war should be understood as an international armed conflict, where the technologies of cyber warfare (covert operations of special services, propaganda and radio-electronic intelligence / radio-electronic warfare / EW) are transformed into operations of the armed forces. Where transformation means the integration of digital technologies into all components of warfare.

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